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ABSTRACT  
This article examines the theories and practices of neoliberalism across thirteen aspects of 
(‘things you need to know about’) neoliberalism. They include the argument that 
neoliberalism is not reducible to a cogent ideology or a change in economic or social policies, 
nor is it primarily about a shift in the relationship between the state and the market or 
between workers and capital in general, or finance in particular. Instead, neoliberalism is a 
stage in the development of capitalism underpinned by financialisation. Neoliberalism by its 
nature is highly diversified in its features, impact and outcomes, reflecting specific 
combinations of scholarship, ideology, policy and practice. In turn, these are attached to 
distinctive material cultures giving rise to the (variegated) neoliberalisation of everyday life 
and, at a further remove, to specific modalities of economic growth, volatility and crisis. 
Finally, this paper argues that there are alternatives, both within and beyond neoliberalism 
itself. 
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Introduction 
 
Oh no, not another piece on neoliberalism, synthesising what has gone before, adding its own 
particular angle, and thereby compounding the confusion as much as clarifying what has gone 
before.1 And, what’s more, written with a popular title along the lines of Ha-Joon Chang’s 
(2011) 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism. But appearances can be deceptive. 
For, whilst this is a stocktaking exercise, delivered to some degree in popular and stark form, 
it gains depth from three sources. One is longstanding scholarship on neoliberalism itself.2 
Another is being able to view, and to present, neoliberalism in light of the global crisis. The 
third is to have illustrated the nature of neoliberalism through comparative case studies 
around housing, health, pensions and water, themselves situated in the broader context of 
study of the impact of financialisation on economic and social functioning.3  
 
 This intellectual exercise is both significant and timely because the current ‘age of 
neoliberalism’ has already lasted beyond one generation – exceeding the lifetime of the 
preceding Keynesian ‘golden age’ – and there are no signs that it is about to give way. The 
solidity of neoliberalism, its continuing ability to renew itself and intensify its hold on 
governments and societies despite economic volatility and the depth of the current crisis, 
warrants recognition and detailed investigation. We offer our contribution in what follows. 
 
1 
 
The first thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that it represents a new stage in the 
development of capitalism emerging in the wake of the post-war boom.  
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In the social sciences literature, neoliberalism has generally been understood in four 
closely-related and not always easily separable ways: (a) as a set of economic and political 
ideas inspired, unevenly and often inconsistently, by the (neo-)Austrian School and 
monetarism;4 (b) as a set of policies, institutions and practices inspired and/or validated by 
those ideas;5 (c) as a class offensive against the workers and the poor led by the state on 
behalf of capital in general and finance in particular (this attack is normally justified by 
recourse to neoliberal ideas and carried out through so-called economic ‘adjustment’, 
especially in developing but increasingly in developed countries in crisis),6 and (d) as a 
material structure of social, economic and political reproduction underpinned by 
financialisation, in which case neoliberalism is the current phase, stage, or mode of existence 
of capitalism. Each conceptualisation of neoliberalism necessarily involves a further issue: 
does this concept offer anything of substance or coherence in understanding the 
contemporary world as opposed to ‘free market’ capitalism, post-fordism (underpinning 
postmodernism), the ‘knowledge economy’, the ever popular consumer society, or 
whatever?7  
 
Our own starting point is to characterise neoliberalism in light of approach (d). This 
immediately raises three further questions. First is how do we define a stage of capitalism. 
This is done through the distinctive ways in which economic reproduction (the accumulation, 
distribution and exchange of value) is organised and reorganised and its implications for 
social reproduction (the structures, relations, processes and agents that are not directly or 
predominantly economic, including the political and the ideological). As Dardot and Laval 
(2013, p.14) rightly put it, ‘the originality of neoliberalism is precisely its creation of a new 
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set of rules defining not only a different “regime of accumulation”, but, more broadly, a 
different society’. 
 
Second is how do we characterise previous stages of capitalism. This is to some 
degree academic as there tends to be uniformity over the periodisation of capitalism into 
separate stages even if slightly different criteria from ours are used to do so.8 Some sort of 
laissez-faire period in the nineteenth century is presumed to give way to a more monopolistic 
stage in the first half of the twentieth century which then passes to a stage in which state 
intervention is significant, conventionally termed the Keynesian or Fordist period.9 More 
significantly, stages of capitalism are distinguished by global and not merely a collection of 
national conditions, so it would be inappropriate to start inductively from the classification of 
countries into those that are more or less (neo)liberal, Keynesian or whatever. Rather, 
different countries exist within, and influence, the dominant stages of global capitalism in 
different ways, and the same is true of the economic, the political and the ideological more 
generally at different levels and in different arenas. 
 
The third issue is why should neoliberalism be considered a new and separate stage of 
capitalism. Our answer is to be found throughout what follows but is fundamentally based 
upon the insight that the most salient feature of neoliberalism is financialisation. As is shown 
in the fifth thing, the rise of financialisation over the past thirty years, defined as the 
intensive and extensive accumulation of interest-bearing capital, has transformed profoundly 
the organisation of economic and social reproduction. These transformations include not only 
outcomes but the structures, processes, agencies and relations through which those outcomes 
are determined across production, employment, international integration, the state and 
ideology. The term financialisation, then, encapsulates the increasing role of globalised 
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finance in ever more areas of economic and social life. In turn, financialisation underpins a 
neoliberal system of accumulation that is articulated through the power of the state to impose, 
drive, underwrite and manage the internationalisation of production and finance in each 
territory, often under the perverse ideological veil of promoting non-interventionism. 
 
Our favoured approach, then, not only claims that neoliberalism is the current stage, 
phase or mode of existence of capitalism but also explains how it should be understood as 
such. It also implies that the starting point in specifying neoliberalism must have both logical 
and historical content. The former concerns the nature of economic reproduction under 
neoliberalism, while the latter focuses on the (uneven) ways in which neoliberalism exists 
across different countries including both social and economic reproduction. For, as will be 
seen under the tenth thing, neoliberalism is distinctive but not homogenising. Instead, it 
fosters diversity and differentiation underpinned by common aspects. It is the latter that have 
to be identified in the first instance, together with their internal contradictions, tensions and 
sources of dynamics and, consequently, potential to realise uneven outcomes and the 
mechanisms and determinants through which they do so in specific instances. In contrast, the 
commonly held presumption that neoliberalism is homogenising is grounded at an 
excessively concrete level and in a selective manner, either missing out on the diverse 
consequences of the common drivers of neoliberalism, or inevitably concluding that it is an 
incoherent specification of contemporary capitalism in light of this diversity.10 
 
This approach to neoliberalism informs a specific understanding of two key features 
of the contemporary political economy. These are, first, that financialisation has transformed 
the global patterns of growth. The rates of investment and GDP growth in the advanced 
economies have tended to decline since the crisis of the so-called Keynesian, Fordist and 
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social democratic ‘golden age’, regardless of the unprecedentedly favourable conditions for 
capital accumulation, in part imposed through neoliberalism itself. These conditions include 
the West’s victory in the Cold War and the collapse of most nationalist movements in the 
Global South, and the closely related liberalisation of trade, finance and capital movements, 
the provision of unparalleled support to accumulation by competing states, the containing of 
taxation, transfers and welfare provision in most countries, the secular decline in the power of 
trade unions, peasant movements, left parties and social movements (the traditional sources 
of resistance within previous forms of capitalism), and the unprecedented ideological 
hegemony of a bogus but vociferous ‘free market’ capitalism. Finally, the unprecedented 
availability of new technologies serves as a potential source of productivity increase, 
alongside significant increases in the global capitalist labour force, not least with China’s 
integration into the capitalist world economy. Instead of thriving on the basis of these 
conditions, global accumulation in the core countries has been hampered by continuing 
instability and, since 2007, by the deepest and longest economic crisis since the Great 
Depression.  
 
The second key feature is that neoliberal patterns of production, employment, finance 
and consumption have simultaneously sustained impressive rates of investment and GDP 
growth in particular regions, with Northeast and Southeast Asia to the fore and, more 
recently, the transformation of China into the assembly hub of the world.11 This is far from 
suggesting that neoliberalism fosters an unproblematic ‘global convergence’. Rather, it 
creates new patterns of uneven and combined development, in which unparalleled prosperity 
within and across countries and regions, and for specific social strata (possibly identified as 
financial or other elites or oligarchs, the top 1%, the top 0.01% or whatever), both, coexist 
with new patterns of poverty as well as its reproduction in areas where it already prevailed. 
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2 
 
The second thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that it is not reducible to a cogent 
ideology, but it is attached to a wide spectrum of ideas. These ideas display a changing 
relevance in rationalising current conditions and selected policies, quite apart from their 
leverage over state policy and in confining and steering the political and other contestations.  
 
Neoliberalism draws heavily, if at times indirectly, upon the Austrian tradition of 
Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek and their neo-Austrian successors, and the US 
monetarist school associated with the Department of Economics, University of Chicago in 
general and with Milton Friedman in particular. They argue, albeit in sharply dissimilar and 
logically incompatible ways, that differently endowed property-owning individuals 
exchanging goods, services and information in minimally regulated markets constitute the 
most desirable form for allocating resources and should prevail over an interventionist role of 
the state and, even if less apparent in popular discourse, democratic processes: the neoliberal 
ideology of free markets can never entirely part company with its antithesis in some respects, 
the authoritarian state.12  
 
Despite their shared purposes and conclusions, even casual examination reveals 
considerable tensions between these scholarly underpinnings of neoliberalism. For example, 
while the (neo-)Austrians emphasise the inventive and transformative subjectivity of the 
individual and the spontaneous emergence of an increasingly efficient order through market 
processes, neoclassical economics focuses on the efficiency properties of a static equilibrium 
achieved entirely in the logical domain on the basis of unchanging individuals, resources and 
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technologies and, possibly, mediated by the semi-divine intervention of the ‘auctioneer’. Nor 
does either capture the political economy and moral philosophy associated with Adam Smith, 
despite their obsessive rhetorical recourse to the ‘invisible hand’, with its meaning and 
rationale subject to varieties of (mis)interpretations.13 
 
The analytical inconsistencies and policy failures of monetarism have been exposed in 
merciless detail by Keynesian and heterodox economists, but these shortcomings have been 
largely ignored by mainstream economists, policymakers and the media.14 They promoted, 
instead, a populist understanding of ‘competitiveness’, ‘individual freedom’ and ‘democracy’ 
that has validated neoliberal policy reforms and repression of opposition in country after 
country, while also providing reassurance that the neoliberal reforms spawn the best of all 
possible worlds.  
 
Despite, or because of, its impressive strengths, neoliberal ideology remains too 
fragmented to provide a coherent representation of society. It offers, instead, an individualist, 
formally egalitarian, meliorist and universalist conception of self and society. This worldview 
justifies a set of loosely articulated finance-friendly state policies and practices giving 
neoliberalism a semblance of coherence in the realm of ideas, and considerable resilience in 
practice: these policies cannot be contested easily, for the neoliberal restructuring of the 
economy and society not only narrows drastically the scope for, and directions of, debate, but 
also hollows out the institutional channels from which alternatives could emerge. These 
limitations are notable, for example, in stridently defended privatisations that are habitually 
awarded to, or create, monopolies, and in decentralisation of state provision, in which a 
leading thrust is to ‘devolve’ responsibility for delivery to lower levels of administration 
(claiming also to democratise), whilst not providing sufficient resources to allow for 
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provision to meet requirements whether formal or otherwise, and imposing the requirement to 
rely on private suppliers (see ninth thing). 
 
3 
 
The third thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that it is not fully nor appropriately 
understood as the mirror image of, or a reaction against, Keynesianism, itself often 
inadequately seen as the explanation for the post-war boom.  
 
Although almost every area of economic and social reproduction has been 
reconfigured under neoliberalism (see first and second things), neoliberal ideology tends to 
induce a shallow opposition between neoliberalism and Keynesianism, as if the former could 
be reduced to the rollback of the latter. In turn, Keynesianism is often described through 
‘state intervention’ and collectivised forms of provision, including the short-run 
macroeconomic manipulation of effective demand, the welfare state, nationalised industries, 
some measure of planning and social contracts, which might progress to socialism through 
incremental reform.  
 
It may be appealing to see neoliberalism as the counterpart to this conception of 
Keynesianism, offering a swing in the balance between market and state provision (see 
fourth thing). Even acknowledging that Keynesianism is associated with more or less 
progressive forms of state expenditure and intervention, the post-war boom was not driven by 
a bland and presumably incremental socialism but by economic and social restructuring with 
internationalisation of all forms of capital to the fore, especially that of productive capital, 
supported by (mainly US-dominated) finance, with a heavy role for the state in promoting 
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such restructuring through both national and international corporate champions.15 In turn, 
Keynesianism was driven to collapse because of the economic and social transformations that 
it engendered and supported, and the contradictions embodied in its own policies.16 The 
simplistic dualism between Keynesianism and neoliberalism fails to acknowledge the broadly 
spread and deeply rooted transformations in economic and social reproduction and their 
reflection in the profound changes across each of scholarship, ideology and policy in 
practice.17  
 
This failure to recognise the complex relationship between neoliberalism and 
Keynesianism has fed two additional illusions. One strand of thought, especially within 
Marxism, sees the emergence of neoliberalism in general and financialisation in particular as 
either the epiphenomenal consequence of, or the functionalist response to, the still unresolved 
crisis of Keynesianism.18 Such reductionism is insufficient because it simply sets aside three 
decades of global restructuring of production, employment, trade, finance, ideology, state and 
society, and overlooks the role of financialisation (see fifth thing) in promoting and 
supporting the contemporary (neoliberal) forms of accumulation and the social reproduction 
that accompanies it.19 
 
The antithetical illusion, associated with social democracy, is that a return to 
Keynesianism can restore more favourable economic and social conditions today. Even 
though higher taxes, controls on trade, domestic finance and capital flows, expanded social 
provision and the fine-tuning of aggregate demand can help to address competing short-term 
macroeconomic objectives and promote short-term improvements in economic performance 
and social welfare, these policies would have only limited bearing on the long-term 
performance and underlying dynamics of the global economy and, even if achievable today, 
	  	  
11 
 
would remain hostages to neoliberal imperatives. Highlighting the contradictions of 
neoliberalism by contrast with (the strengths and virtues of) what existed before is an 
important analytical task in its own right, but it will neither reveal alternatives to 
neoliberalism nor make the limitations of Keynesianism disappear in practice. 
 
It follows that neoliberalism and the potential for overcoming it cannot be 
encapsulated in conventional debates in macroeconomics, which express the rivalry between 
more or less sophisticated versions of monetarism and Keynesianism over whether and how 
to manipulate effective demand and other macroeconomic variables in order to deliver rapid 
and stable accumulation.20 This bypasses almost entirely the problems of economic and social 
restructuring and reproduction. Even if alternative policies are appropriately identified, the 
means to secure them against neoliberal imperatives remains unaddressed as neoliberals 
themselves would suggest in terms of the imperatives of the market, globalisation and so on. 
 
4 
 
The fourth thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that it is not primarily about a 
(possibly pendular) shift in the relationship between the state (or the Polanyian social or 
collective) and the market.  
 
Market-state dualism is insufficient because neoliberalism is not defined by the 
withdrawal of the state from social and economic reproduction.21 As Wacquant (2009, p.307) 
suggests: 
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A central ideological tenet of neoliberalism is that it entails the coming of ‘small 
government’: the shrinking of the allegedly flaccid and overgrown Keynesian welfare 
state and its makeover into a lean and nimble workfare state … stressing self-reliance, 
commitment to paid work, and managerialism … [But] the neoliberal state turns out 
to be quite different in actuality. 
 
Under neoliberalism state institutions intervene upon and through markets and other 
institutions in specific ways that tend to extend and/or reproduce neoliberalism itself.22 
Exactly the same is true of other systems of accumulation, not least those attached to the 
Keynesian, developmental or Soviet-type states that are presumed to have been more 
interventionist.23 In all these cases, the roles of ‘the state’ and ‘the market’ (unduly 
undifferentiated) cannot be usefully identified through their simplistic opposition. Instead, the 
relevant patterns of accumulation, restructuring and social and economic reproduction can be 
understood only through relatively concrete and historically specific analyses. These must 
include the interaction, contestation and co-operation among specific institutions within, 
across and beyond that putative divide. Those processes are themselves heavily influenced 
by, but not reducible to, the underlying economic, political and ideological (class) interests 
that act upon and through such institutions. 
 
In practice, then, first, much has been achieved through state provision in the past, and 
this has itself become the basis for privatisation, for example, in terms of availability of 
productive facilities. The scope for such achievements can only have been enhanced over 
time through improved technological capabilities and new management techniques. Yet, 
these successes are rarely if ever recognised, while public provision is invariably and 
arbitrarily deemed to be inferior to private provision often on the basis of casual or flawed 
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studies, that rarely even consider firm and market structure, finance, degree of monopoly and 
so on.24  
 
Second, state intervention has been transformed rather than simply ‘reduced’ under 
neoliberalism (see sixth thing). Currently, while the overall logic of state policies and 
interventions remains to promote economic and social reproduction and the restructuring of 
capital, the interests and role of finance have increasingly come to the fore either directly or 
indirectly. Such is evident, for example, from the policy responses to the global crisis and the 
continuing recession; but it is equally characteristic of the policies implemented over the 
entire neoliberal period, as the interests of private capital in general and of finance in 
particular have been favoured by the state (see eighth thing).  
 
5 
 
The fifth thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that it is underpinned by, although 
not reducible to, financialisation.25 
 
Whilst seeing neoliberalism as tied to financialisation is pushing against an open door, 
especially in the wake of the current global crisis, financialisation itself has often been 
imprecisely defined and variously understood across a burgeoning literature. In much of this 
literature, financialisation is merely a buzzword reflecting the greater significance of finance 
in economic and social reproduction in recent decades, and the (closely related) growth and 
proliferation of financial assets. However, if financialisation is defined as the increasing 
presence and influence of finance, then, given its remarkable rise over the last thirty years, it 
is tautological to define neoliberalism as attached to financialisation. This leaves open the 
	  	  
14 
 
question of the drivers and contradictions of financialisation and neoliberalism, and how they 
should be addressed in terms of analytical content and their effects.  
 
Our more specific view of financialisation focuses, instead, on the role of finance as 
(interest-bearing) capital and not just as financial or credit relations in general. It is precisely 
in this respect that financialisation marks a departure from the past both in the scale and in 
scope of financial activity in pursuit of financial returns at the expense of production. In this 
sense, a mortgage, for example, remains a simple (transhistoric) credit relation between 
borrower and lender. However, it becomes embroiled in financialisation once that mortgage 
obligation is sold on as part of some other asset, which becomes routinised only under 
neoliberalism. With such financialisation spread more generally, so grows the influence of 
finance over the control of resource allocation – including the flows of money, credit and 
foreign exchange and, correspondingly, the level and composition of output, employment, 
investment and trade, and the financing of the state – by money-capital embodied in an array 
of (more or less esoteric) financial assets.26 Those assets are created, held, traded and 
regulated by specialist institutions that, under neoliberalism, are integrated in a distinctly US-
led global financial system.27 
 
The creation and circulation of these financial assets is an intrinsically speculative 
activity that tends to become unmoored from the constraints of production, even though this 
autonomy can never be complete.28 The ensuing tensions and limitations lead to a number of 
outcomes that characterise financialised accumulation. These include the diffusion of a 
peculiar form of short-termism in economic decisions (e.g., not only through purely 
speculative activities but also through securitisable long-term investment, with pursuit of 
immediate profitability at the expense of productivity growth);29 the imperative for 
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generating and appropriating surplus out of finance; and the explosive growth of rewards to 
high-ranking capitalists and managers in every sector, especially finance itself, fuelling the 
concentration of income under neoliberalism. These financialised forms of accumulation are 
mutually reinforcing, but they can also dysfunctionally diverge (see twelfth thing).  
 
The relations of mutual determination between finance and economic and social 
reproduction, identified above, establish the material basis of neoliberalism as a system of 
accumulation, described in the first thing.30 In turn, financialisation has supported the global 
restructuring of production, that has become known as ‘globalisation’, and the reconstitution 
of US imperialism in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, the US defeat in 
the Vietnam War and the Iranian revolution.31  
 
This understanding of financialisation has four significant implications. First, 
financialisation underpins neoliberalism analytically, economically, politically and 
ideologically, and it has been one of the main drivers of the restructuring of the global 
economy since the 1970s; financialisation is, then, the defining feature of the forms taken 
today by accumulation and economic and social reproduction. Second, financialisation has 
been buttressed by institutional transformations expanding and intensifying the influence of 
finance over the economy, ideology, politics and the state. Third, contemporary 
financialisation derives both from the post-war boom and from its collapse into the 
stagflation of the 1970s.32 Fourth, financialisation has been closely associated with the 
increasing role of speculative finance in economic and social reproduction, not least through 
privatisation of public utilities and, more recently, public-private partnerships in provision of 
economic and social infrastructure. 
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6 
 
The sixth thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that it does not merely involve a 
change in policies that, in principle, could be readily reversed.  
 
The neoliberal ‘policy reforms’ implemented through Reaganism, Thatcherism and 
the (post-)Washington Consensus are supported by five ontological planks.33 First is the 
dichotomy between markets and the state, implying that these are rival and mutually 
exclusive institutions. Second is the assumption that markets are effective if not efficient 
while state intervention is wasteful because it distorts prices and misallocates resources in 
comparison with what an ideal market would have done, induces rent-seeking behaviour and 
fosters technological backwardness. Third, the belief that technological progress, the 
liberalisation of finance and capital movements, the systematic pursuit of ‘shareholder value’ 
and successive transitions to neoliberalism around the world have created a global economy 
characterised by rapid capital mobility within and between countries and (an ill-defined 
process of) ‘globalisation’. Where they are embraced, rapid growth ensues through the 
prosperity of local enterprise and the attraction of foreign capital; in contrast, reluctance or 
‘excessive’ state intervention (however it may be determined) drives capital, employment and 
economic growth elsewhere. Fourth, the presumption that allocative efficiency, 
macroeconomic stability and output growth are conditional upon low inflation, which is best 
secured by monetary policy at the expense of fiscal, exchange rate and industrial policy tools. 
Fifth, the realisation that the operation of key neoliberal macroeconomic policies, including 
‘liberalised’ trade, financial and labour markets, inflation targeting, central bank 
independence, floating exchange rates and tight fiscal rules is conditional upon the provision 
of potentially unlimited state guarantees to the financial system, since the latter remains 
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structurally unable to support itself despite its escalating control of social resources under 
neoliberalism. 
 
Neoliberalism has not only changed the policies adopted by governments but also the 
conditions within which policy is conceived, formulated, implemented, monitored and 
responded to. This has been recognised clearly, if partially, in the literatures that seek to 
distinguish different types of capitalism.34 For example, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
approach perceives differences in the institutional construction of policy and, in the case of 
social policy, the Welfare Regimes Approach (WRA) focuses on the balance of power and 
resources between capital and labour and how they are mediated through (influence upon) the 
state. Presumably, each of these approaches would emphasise the encroaching gains of 
neoliberal capitalism, although neither was originally grounded upon the changing role of 
finance in specifying the varieties and regimes, respectively, and their evolving fortunes.35 
Instead, these approaches are caught on the intellectual cusp between the post-war boom and 
neoliberalism, seeking to defend or promote what is perceived to be the best of the past 
(boom) against the worst of what was yet to come, itself extrapolated from the past as a less 
successful liberal form of post-war capitalism.  
 
That neoliberalism is not reducible to changes in macroeconomic policy is not a novel 
insight, as neoliberalism has, often, been defined instead by microeconomic shifts, not least 
through privatisation and commercialisation as symptomatic of the presumed withdrawal of 
state intervention. However, such distinctions between the microeconomic and the 
macroeconomic cannot generally be sustained not least as, for example, the provision of 
economic and social infrastructure straddles both, as do trade, industrial, commercial and, not 
least, financial policy. Our interpretation of neoliberalism as grounded upon finance-driven 
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economic and social restructuring can encompass both (admittedly parodied) extremes of 
micro and macro shifts, integrate them and develop their insights further. 
 
7 
 
The seventh thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that it represents more than a shift 
in the balance of power, primarily against labour and in favour of capital in general and of 
finance in particular, undoubtedly true though this is.  
 
Neoliberalism invariably has a significant impact on class relations and the 
distributional balance between them, for example, through financialisation, globalisation and 
neoliberal reforms. This includes the ‘flexibilisation’ and intensification of labour, the 
limitation of wage growth, the rollback of collective bargaining and the adverse changes in 
the welfare regime, and how each of them has affected workers, women, minorities, 
immigrants, and so on. Neoliberalism has also affected social relations through privatisation 
and the appropriation of the ‘commons’ (i.e., areas where property rights were either absent 
or vested upon the state),36 and through the financialisation of social reproduction (see 
eleventh thing). Finally, neoliberalism has triggered macroeconomic crises that penalise the 
poor disproportionately (see twelfth thing).37 In these ways, neoliberalism has both expanded 
the power of capital and created an income-concentrating dynamics of accumulation that can 
be limited, but not reversed, by marginal (Keynesian) interventions. 
 
These shifts in the balance of power are both symbolic of the establishment of 
neoliberalism and fundamental to its reproduction, with the anti-labour policies and assaults 
of Reaganism and Thatcherism to the fore. These are so significant that, especially in US 
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political economy literature, they are often taken to be the defining characteristic of 
neoliberalism, with financialisation as its consequence. 38 This argument follows from an 
analysis of neoliberalism primarily in distributional terms, suggesting that lower economic 
and social wages cause high inequality as well as deficient demand, to which speculative 
finance is a corollary through both investment by the wealthy and the expansion of credit to 
the poor (for consumption, mortgages, and other short-term responses to wage compression). 
This is, however, to reduce economic and social restructuring in general, and neoliberalism 
specifically, to the spheres of circulation (effective demand) and distribution (between wages 
and profits). In the context of specifying both the balance and the nature of power under 
neoliberalism, this is too limited, and it extrapolates unduly from US (and, to some extent, 
UK) conditions.  
 
This point can be made by reference to what might be termed the social compacting 
paradigm (SCP), which has been deployed to characterise economic and social ‘settlements’ 
over the post-war boom, typically in order to explain comparative national performance: for 
example, why did West Germany and Japan grow faster than the USA or the UK.39 SCP 
suggests that formal and institutionalised negotiation between capital and labour offered 
fuller and stronger labour representation in policymaking, and that the social partnership 
agreement around wage restraint in return for expanding social wages induced higher 
investment and faster productivity growth than the Anglo-Saxon paradigm.  
 
Irrespective of the extent to which differential performance across countries can be 
explained primarily by industrial relations,40 however broadly conceived, the contrast with 
the neoliberal period is striking. The weakening power of labour has led to, and been 
reflected by, its systematic exclusion from policymaking. Consequently, social compacting 
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has itself been widely dismantled and, where it has survived, it has shrivelled into a tokenistic 
ritual or illusory role of legitimation of neoliberal policies addressing the implications of 
faltering growth, rather than negotiating the distribution of gains due to productivity, output 
and income growth. Most importantly, financial policy and the functioning of the financial 
system invariably remain outside the scope of any social compacting.41  
 
Such considerations are well-illustrated by examples in Eastern Europe and South 
Africa where, with the collapse of the Soviet regime and apartheid, respectively, in the early 
nineties, neoliberalism both arrived late and sought to make up for lost time. Necessarily, the 
forms taken by policymaking and the powers underpinning and exercised through the 
transition to neoliberalism were subject to considerable variation across countries and over 
time, and were hardly reducible to a shift from the state to the market (see fourth thing). For 
example, whilst forms of tripartism flourished in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, their content 
was eviscerated as they were used to ease the emergence of new elites and consolidate the old 
in new circumstances. Consequently, in these neoliberal experiences reliance upon, or 
marginalisation, of tripartism has been a matter of convenience, leading to an ‘illusory 
corporatism’ that bears little relationship either to the post-war boom social corporatism in 
the West or to the influence of, and support for, labour characteristic of the Soviet period.42 
 
A similar account can be told of South Africa, where the form taken by social 
corporatism is the Triple Alliance of the ANC, the South African Communist Party and 
COSATU, the confederation of trade unions. Yet, the ANC Government is generally 
recognised as having taken a neoliberal turn in the mid-1990s, not least with the adoption of 
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy framework. As the economy 
was thoroughly restructured through financialisation during the post-apartheid period, the 
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main forum for tripartite policymaking, the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC), became increasingly ineffective because of the non-participation of the 
most powerful businesses and lack of influence over major policies and issues, especially 
those involving finance.43 In short, social compacting under neoliberalism, if and when it 
occurs, actually undermines the labour movement, and much the same is liable to be so of 
new social movements, in and of themselves, in the absence of strong and supportive left 
movements and organisations.  
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The eighth thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that it involves varied and shifting 
combinations of scholarship, ideology, policy and practice, with connections but not 
necessarily coherence across and within these elements.44  
 
The tensions across these domains can be illustrated at three levels. First, the meaning 
and significance of neoliberal scholarship, the ensuing ideology and their policy implications 
have shifted across time, place and issue, and there can be inconsistencies across their 
component parts. These are, often, due to tensions between the rhetorical and policy worlds 
built by the advocates of neoliberalism, and the realities of social and economic reproduction. 
The most striking example is provided by the shift from privatisation to public-private 
partnerships, especially where large-scale state support for private provision of economic and 
social infrastructure is concerned.45 
 
Second, even the most ardent supporter of freedom of the individual in general, and 
market freedom in particular, concedes that those freedoms can only be guaranteed through 
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state provision of, and coercion for, a core set of functions and institutions, ranging over 
fiscal and monetary policy to law and order and property rights, through to military 
intervention to secure the ‘market economy’ when this becomes necessary. In practice, then, 
neoliberalism can be closely associated with authoritarianism, while its attachment to 
classical liberalism and political democracy is hedged and heavily conditional in practice (see 
second thing).46 
 
Third, the tensions and inconsistencies across scholarship, ideology, policy and 
practice were sharply revealed by the policy responses to the current crisis, with the ideology 
of free markets, especially those of finance, smoothly giving way to heavy intervention on its 
behalf, what has been dubbed socialism for the bankers and capitalism for the rest of us, 
followed by a bewildered response from the discipline of economics to events that were not 
so much unpredicted as deemed to be either impossible or subject to policy control. 
Paradoxically, while unlimited resources have been made available to salvage finance, no 
concession has been offered at the level of ideology or scholarship, where the intolerant 
hegemony of mainstream economics remains virtually unscathed. 
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The ninth thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that it has been subject to two 
phases, loosely divided by the early 1990s.  
 
The first phase of neoliberalism is aptly characterised as the transition or shock phase, 
in which the promotion of private capital proceeded in country after country without regard to 
the consequences. This phase requires forceful state intervention to contain labour, 
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disorganise the left, promote the transnational integration of domestic capital and finance and 
put in place new institutional frameworks (see first and third things). 
 
The second (mature) phase has been, if only in part, a reaction to the dysfunctions and 
adverse social consequences of the first phase, not least in social welfare provision. This 
(‘third wayist’) phase focuses on the stabilisation of the social relations imposed in the earlier 
period, the consolidation and continued expansion of the financial sector’s interventions in 
economic and social reproduction, state management of the new modalities of international 
economic integration, and the introduction of specifically neoliberal social policies both to 
manage the deprivations and dysfunctions created by neoliberalism and to consolidate and 
reconstitute social and individual agents along neoliberal lines (see tenth thing). 
 
Both phases require extensive (re-)regulation, despite the rhetorical insistence of all 
manner of neoliberals on the need to ‘roll back’ the state, interpreted, in the first phase of 
neoliberalism, as ‘hollowing out’, followed by the ‘rolling out’ of new and, occasionally, 
more explicit forms of intervention on that foundation in the second phase (see fourth thing). 
Inevitably, these phases are more logical than chronological, as they can be sequenced, 
delayed, accelerated, or even overlain in specific ways depending on country, region and 
economic and political circumstances. 
 
10 
 
The tenth thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that it is highly variegated in its 
features, impact and outcomes.  
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Although neoliberalism has an identifiable material and ideational core (see first, 
second and fifth things), and neoliberal policies share readily recognisable features, 
neoliberal experiences take a wide variety of forms in different countries and over time (see 
ninth thing). There are three reasons for this. First, despite its common core, neoliberalism 
can be associated with significant differences in the forms, degrees and impact of 
financialisation, the depth and modalities of internationalisation of production and 
dependence on external trade, societal changes, ideology, structures of political 
representation, and so on.  
 
Second, these variegated relationships interact among themselves and with specific 
aspects of economic and social reproduction in historically contingent ways. Thus, for 
example, the more or less universal expansion of mortgage markets has interacted with the 
pre-existing housing systems in different ways across countries.  
 
Third, whilst financialisation is a core aspect of neoliberalism, it remains not only 
uneven but also confined in its direct grasp over economic and social reproduction – not 
everything is financialised even where finance or even just the market is present. Thus, many 
public services are not commercialised, let alone financialised. As a result, even though 
financial institutions may not directly dictate how these services are provided, this does not 
mean that financialisation exerts no influence. The result is to create space for diversity in 
deviating not only from exclusive reliance upon financial imperatives where they do apply 
(such as the extent and level of user charges, for example) but also, and inevitably, where 
they do not.47  
 
	  	  
25 
 
In sum, while the secular rise of financialisation and its extended reach across both 
economic and social reproduction is what motivates our understanding of neoliberalism as the 
current stage of capitalism (see first and fifth things), the impact of financialisation is 
variegated across industrial production and other types of enterprise, and so on.48 Concretely, 
whilst financialisation feeds in part by transforming economic and social activity in ways in 
which the associated revenues can be packaged into corresponding assets), the extent and 
influence of financialisation across the various elements of economic and social reproduction 
are highly contingent, reinforcing the variegated nature of outcomes. In short, economic and 
social reproduction cannot be reduced to financialisation, but nor is the latter entirely absent 
of influence where it is not present.49  
 
With the increasing role of financialisation, whether directly or indirectly, there will 
remain dysfunctions and dissonances where the logic of the market does not prevail, most 
obviously with the hard to employ, house, educate, provide for in old age, raise out of 
poverty, provide for health, and so on. This is to raise the issue for neoliberalism of how to 
intervene where the market fails or is absented and which, in practice, is necessarily 
contingent upon how markets and the non-market are formed and contested. Such issues are 
obvious in case of social policy but by no means confined to it where for example, neoliberal 
ideology of (un)deserving poor dovetails with support for those in or into work. Precisely 
because dysfunctions in the hard to serve through the market are multi-dimensional and 
uneven in their incidence, individual anomalies are liable to be created across them either in 
the form of ‘undue’ benefits (to be cut) or ‘undue’ harshness (to be alleviated). In the context 
of chronic increases in inequality and the acute impact of crisis and recession,50 there are 
inevitable pressures both to reduce individual and overall benefits and to protect the most 
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vulnerable, even if this contest can be highly uneven. How these and other tensions within 
neoliberalism are resolved is not pre-determined.  
 
Somewhat different considerations apply where the forms taken by neoliberal 
economic and social reproduction are of more direct interest to the various fractions of capital 
than moderating social conflict and dysfunction in general. The state has long intervened to 
represent the interests of particular capitals, against the interests of others and, in some 
respects, for capital as a whole against the potentially destructive impact of competition 
between capitals. This remains the case under neoliberalism and implies that the state does 
not privatise everything, does not rely exclusively on private finance, and can even exclude 
such in order to pursue other interests and dynamics not least those of productive capital (on 
which financialisation in other spheres may heavily depend). Nonetheless, such interventions 
tend to be marked by the neoliberal condition, especially where private and/or international 
finance is involved, whether directly or indirectly, or even where it is absent because, for 
example, of continuing state provision (itself to be contingently explained and related to the 
broader role of finance, not least in funding the state and influencing its policies).  
 
Whilst the current grip of neoliberalism raises doubts about the strength and viability 
of social resistance against the commodification of ‘sacred’ types of provision (including 
public goods and the environment), our perspective is distinctive in two respects. On the one 
hand, there is a social content to all objects of provision, including commodities, and each is 
open to particular types of reaction against market forms as is evident, for example, in the 
differences between housing, water, transport and health, and the wide variety of the targets 
of charity, from food banks to woodlands to opera. On the other hand, the dualism between 
neoliberal (re-)commodification and decommodification under, despite or against 
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neoliberalism, is too crude. In other words, simply focusing on market forms is insufficient 
because these are far from homogeneous,51 as they can reflect everything from production for 
profit to user charges with (more or less targeted) subsidies, and obliterating the ways in 
which commodities serve provision along the chains of activities that attach production to the 
market. 
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The eleventh thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that its economic and social 
reproduction is attached to particular material cultures that give rise to what might be 
termed the (variegated) neoliberalisation of everyday life.  
 
It was consistently shown by the previous things that neoliberalism has redefined the 
relationship between the economy, the state, society and individuals. It has constrained the 
latter to give their lives an entrepreneurial form, subordinated social intercourse to economic 
criteria, and neutered the previous structures and institutions of political representation. The 
ideology of self-responsibility has been especially significant since it deprives the citizens of 
their collective capacities, agency and culture, values consumption above all else, places the 
merit of success and the burden of failure on isolated individuals, and suggests that the 
resolution of every social problem requires the further individualisation and financialisation 
of social provision and intercourse.  
 
The scholarly literature has pinpointed these features of neoliberalism in different 
ways, for example, through the idea that finance ‘exploits us all’.52 This notion draws upon, 
first, the intuition that low and stagnant wages, high unemployment, privatisation of basic 
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services and the introduction of user charges have undermined the ability of many to sustain 
customary or desired living standards in the absence of credit, so that exploitative 
indebtedness results by way of (strictly temporary) remedy. Second, it is seemingly validated 
by the proliferation of financial relationships and institutions into daily life under 
neoliberalism. Such a perspective contains an element of truth in that financialisation has 
been associated with increasing inequalities of access and with volatility and insecurity in the 
provision of many aspects of economic and social life, with the potential for deprivation to be 
mutually compounding and multi-dimensional. But the nature and incidence of such 
deprivations are far from uniform across different social strata, age groups and areas of 
provision, and it is doubtful that the financialisation of everyday life is primarily 
characterised by exploitative indebtedness.  
 
A broader approach suggests that the financialisation of daily life is better understood 
in terms of the subjection (which may or may not include relations of exploitation) of 
households to financial markets and processes. For example:53 
 
[H]ouseholds have become a frontier of capital accumulation, not just as producers 
and consumers, but also as financial traders … The requirements of this emergent 
financial citizenship for the house and households extend beyond just honouring 
payments on a home purchase, it is requiring a culture of financial calculation that 
becomes absorbed as part of the daily norms and dispositions of social being.  
 
However, this framing immediately begs the question of which activities attached to the 
household are subject to a culture of (financial) calculation, why and how, and whether (in 
the absence of profit as the bottom line) they cohere into an integral system including both 
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calculation and stable trade-offs. In turn, the corresponding social norms of financial 
behaviour are highly contingent upon the extent to which financialised forms of provision are 
prevalent, and what are the norms for provision of what is not financialised.54 Inevitably, 
then, across commodity consumption, housing, education, health, transport and so on, the 
impact of financialisation will be highly uneven and differentiated and far from reducible to, 
nor even primarily influenced by, an increasing presence of financial calculation. 
 
 A more promising approach can be rooted in the work of Foucault in seeing the 
neoliberalisation of everyday life – including the financialisation of social intercourse – as the 
subjective, if resisted and reflexive, internalisation of specifically neoliberal norms and 
dispositions.55 For Dardot and Laval (2013, p.8): 
 
Neoliberalism is not merely destructive of rules, institutions and rights. It is also 
productive of certain kinds of social relations, certain ways of living, certain 
subjectivities … This norm enjoins everyone to live in a world of generalized 
competition; it calls upon wage-earning classes and populations to engage in 
economic struggle against one another; it aligns social relations with the model of the 
market; it promotes the justification of ever greater inequalities; it even transforms the 
individual, now called on to conceive and conduct him- or herself as an enterprise. 
For more than a third of a century, this existential norm has presided over public 
policy, governed global economic relations, transformed society, and reshaped 
subjectivity. The circumstances of its triumph have often been described – in its 
political aspect (the conquest of power by neoliberal forces), its economic aspect (the 
expansion of globalized financial capitalism), its social aspect (the individualization 
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of social relations to the detriment of collective solidarities, the extreme polarization 
between rich and poor), and its subjective aspect. 
 
Even though this is more than an agenda of what needs to be discovered than discovery itself 
it suggests, once again, that the content of, and pathways to, neoliberalisation and the 
responses to it are highly diverse.  
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The twelfth thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that it is associated with specific 
modalities of economic growth, volatility and crisis. 
 
The neoliberal restructuring of economic reproduction introduces mutually 
reinforcing policies that dismantle the systems of provisioning established previously (which 
are defined, often ex post, as being ‘inefficient’), reduce the degree of coordination of 
economic activity, create socially undesirable employment patterns, feed the concentration of 
income and wealth, preclude the use of industrial policy instruments for the implementation 
of socially determined priorities, and make the balance of payments structurally dependent on 
international flows of capital. In doing this, and despite ideological claims to the contrary, 
neoliberalism fuels unsustainable patterns of production, employment, distribution, 
consumption, state finance and global integration, and it increases economic uncertainty, 
volatility and vulnerability to (financial) crisis. 
 
In particular, financial sector control of economic resources and the main sources of 
capital allows it to drain capital from production; at the same time, neoliberalism 
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systematically, if unevenly, favours large capital at the expense of small capital and the 
workers, belying its claims to foster competition and ‘level the playing field’. As a result, 
accumulation in neoliberal economies tends to take the form of bubbles which eventually 
collapse with destructive implications and requiring expensive state-sponsored bailouts. 
These cycles include the international debt crisis of the early 1980s, the US savings and loan 
crisis of the 1980s, the stock market crashes of the 1980s and 1990s, the Japanese crisis 
dragging on since the late 1980s, the crises in several middle-income countries at the end of 
the twentieth century, and the dotcom, financial and housing bubbles of the 2000s, 
culminating with the global meltdown starting in 2007.  
 
In turn, neoliberal policies are justified ideologically through the imperatives of 
‘business confidence’ and ‘competitiveness’. This is misleading, because confidence is 
elusive, materially ungrounded, self-referential and volatile, and it systematically leads to the 
over-estimation of the levels and effectiveness of investments that will ensue from the pursuit 
of finance-friendly policies. Moreover, those policies are not self-correcting. Instead of 
leading to a change of course, failure to achieve their stated aims normally leads to the 
deepening and extension of the ‘reforms’ with the excuse of ensuring implementation and the 
promise of imminent success the next time around.56  
 
Unsurprisingly, then, however we interpret the differences between the post-war 
boom (including Keynesianism, developmentalism, Soviet regimes and their variants) and the 
neoliberal period, economic performance for the latter in terms of growth and volatility has 
been generally worse and, ultimately, led to a global crisis driven by finance and 
financialisation, despite unambiguously and unprecedentedly favourable conditions for 
capitalism worldwide (see first thing). 
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The thirteenth thing you need to know about neoliberalism is that there are alternatives, both 
within and beyond neoliberalism itself. 
 
It was shown in the sixth thing that neoliberalism cannot be reduced to a collection of 
policies, which would suggest that alternative policy initiatives can reverse the neoliberal 
reforms and even transcend neoliberalism. Policy changes are certainly essential, but the 
scope for such changes can be questioned in the light of the political means available to the 
opposition, the strength of the coalitions potentially committed to them, and the scope to 
drive the required distributional, regulatory and policy reforms given the neoliberal 
transformation of production, international integration, the state, ideology and society itself. 
None of these can be adequately assessed without a prior understanding of the systemic 
features of neoliberalism and the transformations that it has wrought on class relations and 
institutions and the processes of economic and social reproduction.  
 
It was also shown in the seventh thing that neoliberalism is not a ‘capitalist 
conspiracy’ against the workers, in which case there would be nothing systemic or 
historically-specific about it, since capitalists and the state have always readily conspired 
against the workers.57 Conversely, in this case neoliberalism could be dislocated through a 
counter-conspiracy, or even by changes in the law. Alternatively, this approach can also be 
read as implying that ‘things were much better’ under previous systems of accumulation 
(Keynesian, developmentalist, and so on), which, in principle, should be restored.  
 
	  	  
33 
 
The latter goals are laudable but implausible. For, while neoliberalism is incompatible 
with economic democracy, it simultaneously hollows out political democracy.58 On the one 
hand, the discourse and practice of TINA (There Is No Alternative), often now muted and 
implicit, under neoliberalism blocks the political expression of dissent even in moderate 
forms and feeds apathy, populism and the far right, courting destabilising implications for 
neoliberalism itself. On the other hand, the institutional shifts, the changes in the structures of 
political representation, and the social and economic transformations wrought by 
neoliberalism systematically reduce the scope for the expression of collective interests, the 
emergence of transformative programmes, and even the aspiration to change society beyond 
neoliberalism.  
 
In short, the post-war consensus inspired a political contest over whether collectivism 
in the forms of (Keynesian) reformism or socialist revolution would be capable of continuing 
to deliver progressive outcomes. Neither now is on the agenda, not least as the dominant form 
taken by collective economic and social reproduction has been appropriated by finance. 
Nevertheless, the economic contradictions of neoliberalism, the incremental sclerosis of the 
political institutions regulating its metabolism and the cumulative corrosion of its ideological 
foundations make this system of accumulation resistant to economic change, but also 
vulnerable to a multiplicity of political challenges.  
 
This does not imply that electoral strategies are sufficient, nor that changes in social, 
industrial, financial or monetary policies can fulfil radical expectations. Quite the contrary: 
neoliberalism has repeatedly demonstrated its resilience both in practice and in the realm of 
ideas. But the demand for the expansion and radicalisation of political and economic 
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democracy can integrate widely different struggles, delegitimise neoliberalism and support 
the emergence of alternatives. These are now urgently needed. 
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Notes: 
                                                
1 Much of the neoliberal conundrum is neatly illustrated by Wacquant (2009, p.306): 
‘Neoliberalism is an elusive and contested notion, a hybrid term awkwardly suspended 
between the lay idiom of political debate and the technical terminology of social science, 
which moreover is often invoked without clear referent. For some, it designates a hard-wired 
reality… while others view it as a doctrine … It is alternately depicted as a tight, fixed, and 
monolithic set of principles and programs that tend to homogenize societies, or as a loose, 
mobile, and plastic constellation of concepts and institutions adaptable to variegated strands 
of capitalism’.  
2 See, for example, Ayers and Saad-Filho (2008, 2014), Bayliss et al (2011), Chang, Fine and 
Weiss (2012), Fine (2010a, 2010b), Fine and Hall (2012), Fine and Saad-Filho (2014), Saad-
Filho (2003, 2007, 2008, 2011), Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005) and Saad-Filho and Yalman 
(2010). 
3 This paper does not draw upon material from those case studies, but relevant contributions 
are included in Work Packages 5 and 8 of the Fessud project, http://fessud.eu/ 
4 See Dardot and Laval (2013), Mirowski and Plehwe (2009) and Stedman Jones (2012). 
5 Thus, for Dardot and Laval (2013, p.7), ‘Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, neo-
liberalism has generally been interpreted both as an ideology and as an economic policy 
directly informed by that ideology’. 
6 See, for example, Duménil and Lévy (2004) and the works reviewed in Cahill (2014). 
7 Similar, if not identical, questions might be asked of ‘globalisation’ which is the most 
prominent way of characterising the contemporary world, not necessarily as a stage of 
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development, but with multiple, competing, contested and not always consistent 
interpretations (Kiely, 2005; Kozul-Wright, 2006; Labica, 2007; Rosenberg, 2000, 2005). 
8 Of course, there may be exceptions if periodising by relatively disconnected criteria such as 
political systems, wars and technologies. 
9 This leaves open how to characterise the stage after Keynesianism if not neoliberalism, with 
post-Fordism also having proven incapable of delivering anything other than a temporary and 
unsatisfactory answer. 
10 See Castree (2006) and Ferguson (2007) but also, on the contrary, Hart (2002, 2008) for 
neoliberalism’s contingent diversities as opposed to incoherencies. 
11 Bellamy Foster and McChesney (2012). 
12 See Ayers and Saad-Filho (2014), and note the putative ‘de-politicisation through 
economisation’ (Madra and Adaman, 2014). The neoliberal dilemma across freedom of, and 
yet control over, individual choice is neatly addressed in scholarship, ideology and, 
increasingly, policy in practice, by the notion of ‘nudging’ behaviour (Fine et al 2016). 
13 See Hands (2010) and Witztum (2013) for the poverty of the attempted socialisation of the 
individual in mainstream economics relative to Smith. Medema (2009) demonstrates the 
tension between appealing to pursuit of self-interest as a rationale both favouring and 
opposing state intervention.  
14 Following the decline of Friedman’s monetarism in the 1980s, the emerging neoliberal 
ideas were strapped more or less awkwardly to different versions of ‘supply-side’ and new 
classical economics, new Keynesianism and new institutionalism, depending on how 
imperfectly working markets were conceptualised and incorporated into macroeconomic 
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analysis (see Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 2001, Fine and Milonakis 2009, Milonakis and Fine 
2009 and Fine and Dimakou 2016).  
15 See Duménil and Lévy (2004), Fine and Harris (1985) and, especially, Panitch and Gindin 
(2012). 
16 See Gowan (1999) and Saad-Filho (2007). 
17 See Fine and Milonakis (2009 and 2011). 
18 Most recently, see Kliman and Williams (2015). 
19 The most prominent example of this sort of reasoning is the Brenner hypothesis of 
investment overhang involving competitiveness between nations and large national capitals 
discouraging new investment. See, however, Fine et al (2005) for a critique focusing on the 
extraordinary restructuring in the steel industry. Hypotheses of lack of movement since the 
1970s rarely can provide evidence from particular sectors of the economy for which, of 
course, little has remained the same.  
20 It is part and parcel of the inheritance from Keynesianism and its debate with monetarism 
that health, education, welfare, industrial policy, finance for investment, and so on, as 
opposed to effective demand, are sidelined alongside the focus on the short run as if it were 
independent from the long run. In this respect, monetarism only completed what 
Keynesianism started, finishing with the failure to acknowledge financialisation, itself merely 
the tip of the iceberg in the neglect of the other determinants of economic policy and 
performance. Hence the insights from and limitations of Crouch’s (2009) notion of privatised 
Keynesianism, that neoliberalism is based upon demand management through private credit 
rather than state expenditure. 
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21 As Wade (2013, p.7) rightly puts it, ‘[t]he “market” is the polite way of referring to “the 
owners of capital”, especially financial capital’. 
22 See, for example, Lemke (2001). 
23 See Fine et al (2013) in the context of the developmental state paradigm that accepts the 
analytical agenda of state versus market. 
24 See Bayliss and Fine (2008). 
25 See first thing and Fine (2013a). 
26 Quoting at length from Ashman and Fine (2013, pp.156-57): ‘[F]inancialisation has 
involved: the phenomenal expansion of financial assets relative to real activity; … the 
proliferation of types of assets, from derivatives through to futures markets with a 
corresponding explosion of acronyms; the absolute and relative expansion of speculative as 
opposed to or at the expense of real investment; a shift in the balance of productive to 
financial imperatives within the private sector whether financial or not; increasing inequality 
in income arising out of weight of financial rewards; consumer-led booms based on credit; 
the penetration of finance into ever more areas of economic and social life such as pensions, 
education, health, and provision of economic and social infrastructure; the emergence of a 
neoliberal culture of reliance upon markets and private capital and corresponding anti-statism 
despite the extent to which the rewards to private finance have … derived from state finance 
itself. Financialisation is also associated with the continued role of the US dollar as world 
money despite … its deficits in trade, capital account, the fiscus, and consumer spending, and 
minimal rates of interest … [H]owever financialisation is defined, its consequences have 
been perceived to be: reductions in overall levels and efficacy of real investment as financial 
instruments and activities expand at its expense even if excessive investment does take place 
in particular sectors at particular times; … prioritising shareholder value, or financial worth, 
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over other economic and social values; pushing of policies towards conservatism and 
commercialisation in all respects; extending influence of finance more broadly, both directly 
and indirectly, over economic and social policy; placing more aspects of economic and social 
life at the risk of volatility from financial instability and, conversely, placing the economy 
and social life at risk of crisis from triggers within particular markets …Whilst, then, 
financialisation is a single word, it is attached to a wide variety of different forms and effects 
of finance.’ 
27 Panitch and Konings (2008), Panitch and Gindin (2012) and Rude (2005). 
28 Fine (2013-14), Fine and Saad-Filho (2010, ch.12). 
29 Note that reducing wages in pursuit of profit is by no means unique to neoliberalism. But, 
for the latter, the pressure is that much greater in view of financial imperatives (also 
explaining why rewards within or linked to that sector have become so disproportionate). 
30 Albo (2008) and Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005). 
31 See, inter alia, Duménil and Lévy (2004), Gowan (1999) and Kotz (2015). 
32 For a historical overview see Panitch and Gindin (2012), Rude (2005) and Saad-Filho 
(2007). 
33 Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005). 
34 Thus, for example, the social structures of accumulation approach has been modified to 
suggest that neoliberalism is a particularly dysfunctional articulation of social structures 
(Kotz et al, 2010).  
35 See, in this light, Ashman and Fine (2013) and Fine (2014b) for critiques of VoC and 
WRA, respectively. Note that each approach to different types of (parts of) capitalism is 
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grounded in methodological nationalism in which the global as such is just one factor 
amongst many. 
36 Harvey (2005) calls this process ‘accumulation by dispossession’, an umbrella term for an 
extremely diverse range of phenomena that at most and only occasionally has a limited 
connection to primitive accumulation in the classical Marxist sense and, more often than not, 
are underpinned by financialisation (as, for example, in futures carbon trading, which is 
probably the most fetishised form of dispossession). 
37 See, for example, Duménil and Lévy (2011) and McNally (2014). 
38 Thus, for the monopoly capital school, US capitalism has been chronically beset, even 
during the post-war boom, by deficient demand, in this case deriving from the 
underconsumption deriving from high monopoly prices, and correspondingly low real wages 
and output. For Polanyi Levitt (2013, p. 164): ‘The objective of the neoliberal counter-
revolution was to restore the discipline of capital over labour, and the principal means of 
achieving it were deregulation, liberalization, privatization and explicit attacks on trade 
unions’. 
39 For a critical review, see Fine (2014a). 
40 Significantly for what was to come, germane to comparative performance during the post-
war boom were debates about different financial systems (typically, bank-based vs market-
based) and how conducive they were for economic and social restructuring, in both 
generating finance for investment and interacting with the policymaking processes (Ashman 
and Fine, 2013; Fine and Harris, 1985; Zysman, 1983).  
41 The leading example is provided by the Irish Republic, not least in the wake of the global 
crisis; see Doherty (2011) and Regan (2009). 
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42 For example, in Hungary, ‘[c]ommitted to introducing new fiscal discipline and to cutting 
real wages, the Socialist government unilaterally imposed it austerity budged and reinstituted 
wage controls, bypassing the IRC [Industrial Relations Code] while continuing to claim 
commitment to the tripartite process’ (Ost 2000, p.510). In Poland, ‘the main task of … [the] 
tripartite commission has been to secure labor’s consent to its own marginalization’ (p.515). 
In sum, ‘the best that can be said is that tripartism means formal negotiations over very broad 
issues, with no guarantees that the agreements will become law or be respected by 
employers … equally likely are tripartite sessions where the government simply informs 
“social partners” of its intentions and seeks labor assent to fait accompli’ (Ost 2000, p. 515). 
43 See Webster et al (2013). 
44 See, especially in the context of ‘development’, Bayliss et al (2011), Fine (2010a) and Fine 
and Saad-Filho (2014). 
45 See Bayliss and Fine (2008).  
46 See, for example, Barber (1995) and Bresnahan (2003). 
47 See Gingrich (2015) for variability in institutional forms of social provision in light of what 
is provided and how and corresponding implications for ‘cost’ of neoliberal change. 
48 Note that beyond the pursuit of the eponymous stakeholder value, study of the relationship 
between financialisation and the restructuring of productive capital remains seriously 
underdeveloped, partly because it is limited to drawing upon macroeconomic generalisations 
in terms of low investment. For a telling illustration in the context of financialisation of 
global production networks, see Coe et al (2014). 
49 See, for example, Graeber (2014) on the neoliberalisation of the university. 
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50 For the capacity of the top 10% of the income distribution to grow at the expense of the 
bottom 40%, see Palma (2009) on the ‘neoliberal art of democracy’. 
51 See Fine (2013) 
52 See especially Lapavitsas (2013) and Fine (2010c and 2013-14) for wide-ranging critique 
with alternatives. 
53 Bryan and Rafferty (2014, p.404). 
54 Such financialisation of everyday life directly leads to the notion that the over-indebted are 
in need of financial literacy programmes as a result of being irrational (see Santos, 2014). 
55 See, for example, Langley (2008) and Kear (2013). 
56 This is evident in the ‘evaluatory trap’ associated with privatisation (Bayliss and Fine, 
2008) and in the hype surrounding private sector funding of the public sector. 
57 In Adam Smith’s (2009) famous words, ‘People of the same trade seldom meet together, 
even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices’. 
58 Ayers and Saad-Filho (2014). 
